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Abstract
Background: Autoscopic phenomena are psychic illusory visual experiences consisting of the perception of the
image of one’s own body or face within space, either from an internal point of view, as in a mirror or from an
external point of view. Descriptions based on phenomenological criteria distinguish six types of autoscopic
experiences: autoscopic hallucination, he-autoscopy or heautoscopic proper, feeling of a presence, out of body
experience, negative and inner forms of autoscopy.
Methods and results: We report a case of a patient with he-autoscopic seizures. EEG recordings during the
autoscopic experience showed a right parietal epileptic focus. This finding confirms the involvement of the
temporo-parietal junction in the abnormal body perception during autoscopic phenomena. We discuss and review
previous literature on the topic, as different localization of cortical areas are reported suggesting that out of body
experience is generated in the right hemisphere while he-autoscopy involves left hemisphere structures.
Background
The term autoscopy comes from the Greek words
“autos“ (self) and “skopeo“ (looking at). Autoscopic phe-
nomena are psychic illusory visual experiences defined
by the perception of the images of one’s own body or
one’s face within space, either from an internal point of
view, as in a mirror or from an external point of view.
Autoscopic experiences were first described by the
Greek philosopher Aristotele, but it was subsequently
admirably described in its ambiguous presentation by
Ovid in the third book of its Metamorphoses where the
author narrates the myth of Narcissus, a beautiful boy
who falls in love with his image reflected in a water
source. In the first place he mistakes his own image
with another person, but when he suddenly realizes that
he is looking at the image of himself, desperate for the
hopelessness of his love he is forced to commit suicide.
The variable presentations of the autoscopic phenom-
ena, which will be extensively addressed below in their
scientific meaning and correlates, clearly appear in the
comparison between the aforementioned myth of
Narcissus and the description made by Plautus in his
Amphitryon: here the double (represented by the god
Mercury) is an entity completely distinct from the char-
acter Sosia who shares with his double only the physical
aspect, but not the psychological and intellective atti-
tudes. At difference with Narcissus, Sosia is frightened
by the double: he believes that the double could have
stolen his identity or, worse, that the appearance of the
double could have been caused by the death. As it
appears from the descriptions the theme of the death is
often strictly linked with the theme of the double. Auto-
scopic phenomena are considered at the basis of many
self-portrait paintings [1]: Durer, Rembrandt, Velazquez,
Schiele seem to have painted during autoscopic
experiences.
Dostoevsky made this phenomenon more popular in
the nineteenth century in his novel “The Double”, where
the doppelganger (i.e. haunting double of the self) of
German legends was the background.
The German word “Doppelganger” was brought into
the language, and simultaneously, into the literary tradi-
tion by the novelist Jean Paul Richter, who in 1796
defined the word in a one sentence footnote: “So heissen
Leute, die sich selbst sehen” (So people who see them-
selves are called).
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description in 1844. Subsequently, the term autoscopy
was used to describe various phenomena of various
aetiologies and mechanisms.
Brugger was one of the first authors to study auto-
scopic phenomena [2]. He proposed a classification
scheme based on phenomenological criteria. Along with
examples of illustrative cases, he outlined the main fea-
tures of six types of autoscopic phenomena: the feeling
of a presence, the negative heautoscopy, the inner heau-
toscopy, the autoscopic hallucination, the out of body
experience and the he-autoscopy also defined as heauto-
scopic proper.
The feeling of a presence, first described by Jasper in
1913, is the distinct feeling of the physical presence of
another person or being in the near extracorporeal
space. No visual impressions are involved but frequently
t h ep r e s e n c ei sf e l tt ob e“a tt h ef r i n g eo fv i s i o n ”.L i k e
he-autoscopy, it is usually accompanied by alterations in
the experience of one’s own body. It can be reported by
healthy persons in conditions of sensory deprivation or
social isolation [3]. The feeling of a presence is often
confined to one hemispace particularly when associated
with a seizure disorder [4].
Negative heautoscopy refers to the failure to perceive
one’so w nb o d ye i t h e ri nam i r r o ro rw h e nl o o k e da t
directly. In the latter form the confinement of the (nega-
tive) hallucination to one’s own body and the frequent
coexistence of depersonalisation are considered evi-
dences of its close relatedness with the positive forms of
autoscopic experiences.
In inner heautoscopy, a type of experience frequently
treated by French Authors of the early 20th century [5],
the inner organs of one’s own body are visually halluci-
nated in the extra corporal space.
In the French psychiatry literature of the late 19th and
early 20th centuries, the typical autoscopic hallucination
was also labelled as “mirror hallucination” [6-10] and
consists of a visual perception of an exact mirror image
of oneself, occasionally only one’s face or trunk is per-
ceived. Patients with autoscopic hallucination do not
localize themselves at the position of the illusory body.
Commonly, autoscopic hallucination lasts only a few
minutes or seconds, often followed by flash-like
reoccurrences.
In out of body experience, localization of the psycholo-
gical self to an extrapersonal space is completely disso-
ciated from the perception of one’s body, implementing
the “dissociation of egocentric” from “body-centred-per-
spectives” [11,12]. In this form of autoscopic phenomena
the subject sees himself and the world from a location
different from his physical body (parasomatic visuo-spa-
tial perspective, disembodied location). People explaining
their out of body experience never use the words
“double” or “doppelgänger” in their descriptions. An out
of body experience is defined by the presence of three
phenomenological characteristics: disembodiment (loca-
tion of the self outside one’s body), the impression of see-
ing the world from a distant and elevated visuo-spatial
perspective (extracorporeal egocentric perspective) and
the impression of seeing one’s own body (or autoscopy)
from this elevated perspective [11].
The theme of the separation between self and body is
frequently found in philosophy. Hume claimed that
“when he introspected, he was unable to catch his self
without a perception and was unable to observe ‘any-
thing but the perception’ itself”. He concluded that the
self (or the observing introspective subject) is simply a
collection of different perceptions. The interest of occi-
dental philosophy for the body was also exemplified in
Descartes’ effort to separate mind and body.
The he-autoscopy is rare but probably more frequent
than pure autoscopic hallucinations. The term “Heautos-
kopie” was proposed by Menninger-Lerchenthal [13] to
denote the experience of seeing one’s self and to desig-
nate the classical doppelgänger experience described in
literary accounts [14,15]. The double usually appears
colorless ("foggy”, “pale”,o r“as through a veil”), can
behave autonomously, may or may not mirror the per-
son’s appearance and maintains sidedness. The expres-
sion heautoscopic “echopraxia” means imitation of
bodily movements by the double, giving rise to the illu-
sion that the doppelgänger contains the real mind
[16,17]. Among autoscopic phenomena, “polyopic”
[18,19] and “heterosexual” [20] cases have also been
published. There is considerable variation in the
reported duration of heautoscopic experiences; they may
last for seconds or hours and even cases of persistence
of the double as a steady companion are not exceptional
[21]. Depersonalization may be experienced as a feeling
of strangeness towards one’s own body or as the impres-
sion that one’s own mind is contained by the doppel-
ganger, as in the heautoscopic echopraxia. As in out of
body experience, patients describe the image of the self
as a highly realistic experience. In addition to mere
visual impressions, as in autoscopic hallucination, he-
autoscopy involves somaesthetic and vestibular sensa-
tions. A feeling of detachment or of extreme lightness of
one’s body is regularly present and often vertigo is
reported. Patients describing heautoscopic experiences
always reveal significant changes in the awareness of
their body, generally do not report clear disembodiment
but they are often unable to localize their selves. He-
autoscopy is the encounter with one’so w n“doppelgan-
ger” who appears as an alter ego; patients may experi-
ence themselves to be localized at the position of the
illusory body (bilocation); it is difficult to decide for the
patient whether he/she is disembodied or not and
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in the autoscopic body. The ego, however, remains loca-
lized within the natural boundaries of one’s own body.
Partial epilepsy, particularly parietal and temporal lobe
seizures, is considered the most frequent aetiology
[22-24], but autoscopic phenomena may also occur in
patients with psychiatric disorders and migraine [11,16].
Conrad [21] described an unusual case of autoscopic
phenomenon associated with a tumour of the hypophy-
sis. Other authors reported similar episodes in various
organic diseases [10,11,16,17] and some evidenced preci-
pitating factors and neural correlates [12]. Descriptions
of out of body experience are often reported in patients
undergoing resuscitation procedures [25,26].
To date the central mechanism for autoscopic phe-
nomena are not completely understood. The more con-
vincing hypothesis is a failure to integrate multisensory
signals at the temporo-parietal junction, resulting in a
breakdown of the spatial unity between self and the
body. While the contribution of visual and somatosen-
sory cues of self-location is largely attested by clinical
and experimental data [27-29], little is known about the
contribution of vestibular cues.
With the present report we aim to discuss and review
previous literature on the topic and we present a case of
a woman experiencing with he-autoscopy during epilep-
tic seizures. We could record a video-EEG during one
of the ictal episodes. During the recording we took
notes of the patient impressions. We had the opportu-
nity to describe a rare semiology of he-autoscopy,
accompanied by suicidal behaviour and depression and
to link it with a specific brain activity pattern.
Case report
The patient is a right-handed, 40 year old woman
employed as a teacher in primary school. She was referred
to our neurological centre for sporadic generalized epilep-
tic seizures and reactive depressive syndrome. Early medi-
cal history reported depressive-apathetic episodes during
adolescence and early adulthood lasting for some months
and treated with benzodiazepines. The first generalized
seizure occurred at the age of 26 and was accompanied by
attention and memory deficits for one week. Three further
generalized seizures occurred in 9 years and interictal
EEGs showed widespread slow wave activity. She reported
several unsuccessful therapeutic attempts with carbamaze-
pine (1000 mg/day) and fenobarbital (150 mg/day). Per-
sonality disorder with several cyclic episodes of depression
and maniacal excitation were reported by the patient and
in the past ten years she had been treated with paroxetine
by outpatient psychiatric services. In the last six years
she did not experience further seizures and she sponta-
neously decided to withdraw carbamazepine. In the last
year further episodes of depression and anxiety had
recurred, and were accompanied by two suicide attempts
by poisoning. After the last suicidal attempt, an EEG was
recorded in the intensive care unit and the observation of
widespread slow wave activity prompted her referral to
our clinic. Her cognitive performances were normal
(Mini-Mental State Examination score: 30/30). During
psychological assessment, beyond a logorrheic and anxious
attitude, a history of peculiar events could be evicted even
though the patient manifested initial severe resistance to
express the reason of her distress. She reported to experi-
ence daily symptoms consisting of seeing the image of her
entire body as in a mirror or from an external point of
view. She saw herself not from an elevated visuo-spatial
perspective, as in out of body experience, but in front of
her in normal size and colour without a definable facial
expression. The patient could not clearly define her locali-
zation in space. She reported unclear changes in the
awareness of her body describing herself as projected out
of her body with a feeling of dissociation of mind and
body for a few seconds. When she saw her double from an
external view she maintained sidedness, i.e. right and left
sides were represented as in the real body, unlike images
reflected by a mirror: if she held an object with the right
hand her autoscopic image would hold the same object
with the right hand. Her heautoscopic experience lasted
for less than one minute. These experiences occurred
independently of daily activities, either when she was quiet
alone or working. When the double appeared, it kept act-
ing the patient’s activities. She explained that the experi-
ence to see her double was terrifying and that the
attempted suicides were prompted by this distressing
experience. She reported to have access to the autoscopic
body’s thoughts, words and actions and that the experience
of bilocation was petrifying and shocking. She explained
that these experiences had occurred since her early adoles-
cence, had never subsided and were still present when
she was receiving carbamazepine and fenobarbital. These
episodes were interpreted as he-autoscopic seizures.
In a previous brain MRI performed in another neuro-
logical institution, an abnormal signal from the splenium
of corpus callosum was suspected. But an MRI-based
tractography performed in our institution showed integ-
rity of white matter tracts. MRI scans were performed
using a 3T Philips Achieva scanner. Diffusion tensor
images were acquired in the axial plane with diffusion
sensitization gradients applied in six non-collinear direc-
tions with b-value of 1000s/mm
2.A l li m a g ev o l u m e s
were acquired with six optimized directions using six
repetitions to increase the number of measures. In addi-
tion NMR spectroscopy evidenced no alteration in the
right and left temporo-parietal junction (Figure 1).
Interictal brain SPECT with 99mTC-ECD showed cer-
ebral hypometabolism in both right and left parietal and
occipital lobes (Figure 2).
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bilateral slow wave activity 3-3.5 Hz (Figure 3F). During
her repeated evaluations the patient was instructed to
signal verbally or by hand gestures the possible occur-
rence of her hallucinations. We recorded a video-EEG
during one of her autoscopic experiences showing an
epileptic activity (Figure 3) consisting of a brief (about 1
second) and slow (3.5 Hz) right centro-parietal activity
followed by abrupt discharges represented by fast activ-
ity of polyspikes and sharp-waves of 100-120 uV ampli-
tude and in reversal phase at the P4 lead. After a few
seconds the discharge involved right fronto-temporal
channels and then the left parieto-occipital channel. The
discharge lasted about 30 seconds. The final critical
a c t i v i t yw a sr e p r e s e n t e db ya3 . 5 - 4H zs p i k ea n ds l o w
wave complexes overlapping to widespread slow activity.
No ictal automatisms or motor signs were present.
During the video-EEG recording, before the onset of the
seizure, the patient reported an unclear change in the
awareness of her body, with feelings of derealisation. Then
she signalled by hand gesture the abrupt appearance of
her entire body exactly in front of her, in upright position
and in the same perspective of her previous experiences.
This sensation was coincident with the seizure. During an
a posteriori interview she reported the impression of bilo-
cation. In this episode the double was motionless and
silent. This view of herself in normal size, with the same
clothing and facial expression was concomitant to the
right centro-parietal discharge characterized by fast activ-
ity of polispikes and sharp-waves in reversal phase at the
P4 lead. When the discharges involved right fronto-tem-
poral channels we noted an impairment of consciousness:
the patient, with fixed eyes, stopped answering our ques-
tions, even though she did not report clouding of con-
sciousness in the a posteriori interview. No ictal
automatisms or motor signs were observed. During the
widespread slow EEG activity the patient reported again
an unclear perception of her body, but she signalled that
the autoscopic image had disappeared.
We aimed to study functional connectivity by means
of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) [30],
but the patient expressed her unavailability to further
examinations.
We prescribed Levetiracetam (3000 mg/day) which
resolved her he-autoscopic seizures. Levetiracetam was
administered following the evidence of the seizures.
In the following two months the reported that the sei-
zures did not recur, but depression was evidenced in
Figure 1 Proton MR spectra from left and right temporo-parietal junction. The major metabolite peaks correspond to cholines (Cho) at
3.22 ppm, creatines (Cr) at 3.02 ppm, N-acetylaspartate (NAA) at 2.02 ppm. Axial T2 weighted MR image showing the voxel position at temporo-
parietal junctions used for proton MR spectroscopy. Note that the splenium of corpus callosum is normal.
Figure 2 Interictal brain SPECT with 99mTC-ECD showed a
cerebral hypometabolism in both right and left parietal and
occipital lobes.
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anxious agitation. We decided to address the patient to
psychiatric care due to severe depressive symptoms and
to the high risk of further suicidal attempts.
Discussion and review of the literature
Autoscopic phenomena are illusory own body perceptions
that affect the entire body and lead to conspicuous
abnormalities in embodiment as well as in body owner-
ship. Brugger [2] focused on the main features of the six
types of autoscopic phenomena presenting a classification
scheme based on phenomenological criteria. Depersonali-
sation symptoms are absent only in autoscopic hallucina-
tion and can be described as a reduced awareness of own
body in negative heautoscopy, as a sense of empty body in
inner heautoscopy, as a subjective meaningfulness and
enhanced reality of the experience in out of body experi-
ence and as a sense of familiarity with the external pre-
sence in the feeling of a presence. Table 1 summarizes
some features of the six types of autoscopic phenomena.
Figure 3 Autoscopic seizures. A: slow (3.5 Hz) right centro-parietal activity. Patient reported an unclear change in the awareness of her body, a
feeling of strangeness. B: abrupt discharges constituted by polyspikes and sharp-waves of 100-120 uV in amplitude and in reversal phase at P4
lead. Patient reported a sudden appearance of her entire body exactly in front of her, in upright position. The double was at the same level of
her real body, i.e. the real body was not felt elevated relatively to her double (unlike in out of body experience). She reported a bilocation state.
The double was motionless and silent. C-D: after a few seconds the discharge involved right fronto-temporal channels and then left parieto-
occipital channel. The discharge lasted about 30 seconds. We noted an impairment of consciousness. E: the final critic activity was constituted by
right temporo-parietal spike and slow wave complexes (3.5-4 Hz). Patient reported again un unclear perception of her body, but the double had
vanished. F: slow generalized interictal activity recorded by a previous EEG (3-3.5 Hz).
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Page 5 of 11Table 1 Main features of different autoscopic phenomena
AH h-A FOP OBE Nh-A Ih-A
SEE ONE’S OWN
BODY AS
ONLY PARTS OF
THE DOUBLE ARE
SEEN IN EXACT
MIRROR IMAGE
MIRROR IMAGE, MAINTAINED
SIDEDNESS, DOUBLE IS
COLOURLESS, ECHOPRAXIA
BILOCATION
OFTEN ILLUSION OF THE
PRESENCE AT THE FRINGE
OF VISION, h-A WITHOUT
OPTICAL IMAGE
SEPARATION FROM ONE’S OWN
BODY AS THE CORE OF THE
EXPERIENCE; FROM ELEVATED
PERSPECTIVE
FAILURE TO PERCEIVE ONE’S
OWN BODY EITHER IN A
MIRROR OR WHEN LOOKED
AT DIRECTLY
THE INNER ORGANS ARE
VISUALLY HALLUCINATED
IN THE EXTRAPERSONAL
SPACE
DURATION SECONDS/MINUTES SECONDS/HOURS SECONDS SECONDS/MINUTES SECONDS/MINUTES SECONDS/MINUTES
DISEMBODIMENT - +/- +/- ++ +/- +/-
MAINTAINED
SIDEDNESS
- + NA + NA NA
PSYCHOLOGICAL
PHENOMENOLOGY
-+ + + + + - -
INVOLVED
CEREBRAL
CORTEX
PO (RIGHT?) TPJ (LEFT?) ? TPJ (RIGHT?) SPLENIUM (ONE
DESCRIPTION) [69]
?
PREDOMINANT
INVOLVED
MODALITIES
VISUAL VISUAL AND SOMAESTHETIC SOMAESTHETIC ONLY VISUAL AND SOMAESTHETIC VISUAL AND SOMAESTHETIC VISUAL AND
SOMAESTHETIC
ACCOMPANYING
SYMPTOMS
MICROPSIA
HEMIANOPIA
D D D, SENSATION OF FLOATING OR
FLYING, AUDITORY
HALLUCINATIONS OR ILLUSIONS
OF VIBRATION
D, ASCHEMATIA
ASOMATOAGNOSIA
D
VESTIBULAR
DISTURBANCE
-+ - + + - -
AH = autoscopic hallucination, h-A = he-autoscopy, FOP = feeling of a presence, OBE = out-of-body experience, Nh-A = negative heautoscopy, Ih-A = inner heautoscopy, PO = parieto-occipital cortex, TPJ = temporo-
parietal junction, D = depersonalitation, - = absent, + = present, NA = not applicable; ? = not known; maintained sidedness indicate no shift from left to right in the autoscopic image.
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1Phenomenological aspects of he-autoscopy
We could report a case of he-autoscopy in which the
affected patients have a vague feeling of detachment
from the body accompanied by the sensation of a “dou-
ble consciousness”. He-autoscopy involves visual and
somaesthetic modalities and, similar to out of body
experience, localizes the self in an illusory body at an
extra personal space although the point of localization
of the ego remains within the natural boundaries of
one’s own body. There are some variables that can help
to differentiate among autoscopic phenomena: the pre-
sence of vestibular hallucinations or body schema dis-
turbances, the position of the autoscopic and the
physical body, the kind of view, the sense of bilocation
and finally the sharing of thoughts and words or actions
of the autoscopic body. Among the described variables
five phenomenological characteristics of the autoscopic
body allow to distinguish he-autoscopy from the other
abnormal experiences:
1) the “view": in he-autoscopy subjects see the auto-
scopic body in front-, side- or back-views.
2) the “actions": the autoscopic body can act only in
he-autoscopy (activities of the autoscopic body
appear to be specific to he-autoscopy and almost
absent in out of body experience).
3) the experience of “sharing of thoughts and words”
which are often associated with he-autoscopy and
are less frequent in out of body experience.
4) the “perspective": in he-autoscopy patients fre-
quently experienced to see the double from several
different visuo-spatial perspectives that, in contrast,
were unequivocally localized and experienced as uni-
tary by all out of body experience patients.
5) the “bilocation": only he-autoscopy subjects
reported to be split into two parts of selves.
In addition positive and neutral emotional experiences
are especially rare in he-autoscopy [12,17].
Thus he-autoscopy significantly differs in these com-
plex variables from other autoscopic phenomena, sug-
gesting that different central mechanisms are
underlying. The phenomenological variability of the
autoscopic body (with respect to views and actions) and
the increased frequency of shared thoughts, voices, and
actions between autoscopic and physical body might be
due to different involvements of kinesthetic/propriocep-
tive information processing in he-autoscopy. The shar-
ing of thoughts, voices and actions might make difficult
for the patient to decide where the physical agent is
located and leads to the experience of two observing
selves. Therefore he-autoscopy is not only the reduplica-
tion of one’s physical body, but also the reduplication of
one’s self. The terrifying experience of “not knowing
where the self is” could justify the association with sui-
cide attempts, as in our patient. Our case can be consid-
ered as an example of he-autoscopy in which, typically,
the autoscopic body acts exactly like the real body
(maintaining sidedness) and interacts with it: the patient
experienced to have access to the autoscopic body’s
thoughts and sometimes could verbally communicate
with it. Typically the patient had the impression of
being at two locations at the same time (bilocation) and
positive or neutral emotions never accompanied her
autoscopic experience. She also experienced the he-
autoscopy in the typical upright position, while the view
of the self always in front of her (as in out of body
experience) in the same visuo-spatial perspective, is less
commonly reported [2].
Vestibular sensations were not reported by the patient:
in the Blanke and Mohr analysis [31], vestibular halluci-
nations and body schema disturbances are comparatively
frequent in out of body experience and he-autoscopy
(about 60% of patients). Our case report suggests that
vestibular symptoms are not specific of he-autoscopy
and that their absence does not exclude he-autoscopy or
out of body experience.
He-autoscopy, epilepsy, depression and suicide
Psychological phenomenology differs among different
autoscopic experiences: he-autoscopy and out of body
experience are experienced as profoundly significant
events and in he-autoscopy the quality of emotional
impact considerably varies: one’s doppelgänger can
sometimes be experienced as highly supportive [14], but
in general is offensive or overtly aggressive. A classical
case was reported by Wigan [32], who described the
first non-fictional account of a man who could induce a
visual hallucination of himself. Gradually the double
became more and more autonomous appearing without
being evocated. Utterly distraught, the man shot himself.
Significantly our patient attempted suicide twice, but
specific risks linking he-autoscopy and suicide are not
statistically supported. The association between suicide
and he-autoscopy is a common theme in dramatic
romances and the appearance of the doppelgänger, a
ghostly double of a living person, often announces the
hero’s death that is usually a death by suicide. In Breton
myths the doppelgänger is a version of the Ankou, a
personification of death; in a tradition of the Hebrew
Talmud, to meet himself means to meet God. There are
also several literary examples: in Dostoyevsky’sn o v e l
“The Double” when the protagonist experienced his first
autoscopic experience, he began to think to kill himself
by drowning. In Edgar Allan Poe’ss h o r ts t o r y“William
Wilson”, probably the most dramatic image, the main
character, of questionable morality, is dogged by his
doppelgänger most tenaciously when his moral fails.
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Franz Werfel ("Spiegelmensch”) and Friedrich von Ger-
stäcker ("Der doppelgänger”) had their heroes commit
suicide to escape the horror of being haunted by their
second selves. Some of these authors have not only had
epilepsy but have also known he-autoscopy from perso-
nal experience [33,34]. There are several notable reports
about documented autoscopic experiences: Percy Bysshe
Shelley, an English poet, drowned in the Bay of La Spe-
zia near Lerici and Abraham Lincoln, known to be a
superstitious man, recognised a special meaning to an
autoscopic experience which he seems to have had in
the evening of his election [35]. A rare and dubious
example of a doppelgänger which was both benign and
reassuring is described by Johann Wolfgang von Goethe
in his autobiography “Truth and Fiction” ("Dichtung
und Wahrheit”). More recently Otto Rank, a Freudian
Austrian psychoanalyst, in his book “The Double” [36],
suggested a possible explanation for the frequent recur-
rence of the image of the double in the artistic produc-
tion and folklore. He believes that the double is an
artist’ss t r a t e g yt oe x o r c i s et h et e r r i b l ei d e ao fd e a t h .
“Heautoscopic suicide” also includes cases of attempts
to kill one’s double or, in the most obviously transitivis-
tic manner, observing one’s doppelgänger committing
suicide [37].
Keppler observed that “Often the conscious mind tries
to deny its unconscious through the mechanism of “pro-
jection”, attributing its own unconscious content (a
murderous impulse, for example) to a real person in the
world outside; at times it even creates an external hallu-
cination in the image of this content” [14].
Brugger examined the “hostile interactions between
body and self” [38] indicating four major variants of
“heautoscopic suicide” as an actively imposed or pas-
sively experienced form of self-injurious behaviour: self-
injury/suicide in an attempt to escape the double, fenes-
tration in order to get rid of the double, self-injury/sui-
cide claimed to be inflicted by the double, self-injury/
suicide in an attempt to kill the double and the observa-
tion of the doppelgänger’s self-injury/suicide. He dis-
cussed neuropsychiatric and psychodynamic approaches
to disembodiment concluding that, although there is no
direct clinical or neuroanatomic evidence for a primary
callosal pathology, it is not entirely implausible to
assume an inter-hemispheric disconnection at the basis
of heautoscopic aggression. Of note, in our patient an
early MRI study reported the presence of enlarged sple-
nium callosi. Our MRI study however, including tracto-
graphy examination, did not evidence any abnormality.
Our measurements were, in our patient, inside the
range reported for female subjects, who have commonly
larger splenial bodies than males [39,40]. Even though
heautoscopy, epilepsy and suicide may be a more
common triad than previously recognized [41], we know
little about the mutual correlation, but the description
of the survivors, as in our case, would rather favour a
causal relation between the double experience and the
impulse to kill oneself. Suicide attempts are not infre-
quent in depressed subjects and depression is commonly
associated with epilepsy [42]. In severely depressed
patients “heautoscopy of the Cotard type” (seeing a dead
doppelgänger during the hallucinatory attendance of
one’s own funeral) is not a rarity. The suicidal risk is
further increased by psychiatry comorbidity and drug
use [43-45]. The epileptic focus in the right hemisphere
and the severe depressive symptoms presented by our
patient, support recent hypothesized links between
depression and inter-hemispheric imbalance. Depression
is believed to be associated with a hyperactive right-
hemisphere and a relatively hypoactive left-hemisphere
[46]. Yet, the underlying mechanisms which can explain
the involvement of the right side remain elusive. There
is evidence that the right hemisphere is selectively
involved in processing negative emotions, pessimistic
thoughts and unconstructive thinking styles. Addition-
ally, it mediates vigilance and arousal and had also been
linked with self-reflection, accounting for the tendency
of depressed individuals to withdraw from their external
environments and focus attention inward [46]. The
involved hemisphere is also important to explain possi-
ble language deficits, but ictal speech disorders were not
present in our patient in agreement with the involve-
ment of non dominant hemisphere as showed by EEG
recording. Word finding difficulties are often reported
by epileptic patients and peri-operative and post-surgical
electro-cortical stimulation evidences have highlighted a
role for the anterior part of the dominant temporal lobe
in oral word production [47]. In previous reviews
[23,48,49], autoscopic experiences are mentioned as a
rare but classic symptom in parietal lobe epilepsy. How-
ever it has been reported in association with temporal
lobe epilepsy [50]. There are few reported cases of post-
ictal autoscopic phenomena [51]. Autoscopic experi-
ences have been described not only in focal seizures, but
in a broad range of neurological disorders such as
migraine, neoplasia, infarction and infection [11,12,52]
and also in psychiatric disorders such as schizophrenia,
depression, anxiety and dissociative disorders [16,17]. In
some cases it is difficult to distinguish the autoscopic
experiences from a dreamy-state in which the self is
seen in more complex, dream-like or memory-like
scenes without actually seeing the image of one’s face or
body [53].
Our patient experienced typical he-autoscopy and the
autoscopic episodes were the only ictal symptom. The
ictal EEG performed during the autoscopic experience,
showed a right parietal origin in non-dominant
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These data were confirmed by SPECT findings that
revealed a hypometabolism in parietal and occipital
areas but no brain abnormality was detected by means
of MRI. In contrast with neurophysiological data, patient
reported neither macroasomatognosia, a symptom that
can result from an involvement of the parietal lobe
[23,48,49], nor palinopsia (consistent with an involve-
ment of the visual associative area) nor luminous flashes
in the visual fields (consistent with an involvement of
the primary visual area) nor motor symptoms.
Possible cerebral mechanisms: multisensory processing
and cortical hyperconnectivity
Defining the mechanism of autoscopic phenomena is a
challenge. Menninger-Lerchental [13] first speculated on
different anatomical substrates suggesting that auto-
scopic hallucination originate at the junction of the par-
ietal and occipital lobe, he-autoscopy from the angular
and supramarginal gyrus and out of body experience
from the superior parietal lobe. Blanke and Mohr [31]
summarized anatomical findings of their analysis eviden-
cing that he-autoscopy seems to primarily involve the
left temporo-parietal junction and out of body experi-
ence the right. More recently Blanke and Arzy [54] have
unexpectedly reproduced an effect strongly reminiscent
of the doppelgänger phenomenon via electromagnetic
stimulation of the left temporo-parietal junction. Their
analyses showed that out of body experiences and he-
autoscopy are primarily associated with electrical stimu-
lation, probably inhibition, of the temporo-parietal junc-
tion and autoscopic hallucination with electrical
stimulation in parieto-occipital cortex. Moreover these
experimental data suggest that out of body experiences
are associated with damage to the right temporo-parietal
junction and he-autoscopy to the left temporo-parietal
junction [31,54], whereas autoscopic hallucination is
associated with damage to the right parieto-occipital
cortex [55]. Corporal awareness and experience of the
body ownership are more likely dependent on the right
hemisphere [28]. However with regard to hemispheric
asymmetries no firm conclusion can be drawn. Our case
shows an epileptic focus in the right temporo-parietal
junction: the patient report suggests that the hallucina-
tion perception was an he-autoscopy, as it presents
most of the peculiar characteristics reported by litera-
ture in he-autoscopy. Therefore our report might sug-
gest that he-autoscopy can possibly arise also from
epileptic foci of the right hemisphere. The epileptic dis-
charge (Figure 3A-E) shows a definite localization and
the involvement of the left hemisphere occurs only
when the patient subjectively reports that the hallucina-
tory image has disappeared. In our case report, there-
fore, the EEG shows an epileptic discharge that
originates in the right temporo-parietal junction. It
might be argued that the only evidence of the he-auto-
scopy corresponding to EEG discharge is obtained from
the patient, subjectively signalling the presence of auto-
scopic image of the self during the seizure and by her
detailed description “ap o s t e r i o r i ”. Thus exact timing of
the different feelings might appear uncertain: nonethe-
less EEG discharge was observed and he-autoscopy was
reported. We believe it would be difficult to obtain bet-
t e re v i d e n c et h e nt h eo n ew ea r er e p o r t i n g ,a sav e r b a l
description of symptoms during the seizure would alter
the EEG due to glosso-kinetic artefacts.
Several studies [11,12,31,54-56] proposed that auto-
scopic phenomena are a double failure to integrate pro-
prioceptive, tactile and visual information with respect
to one’s own body (disintegration in personal space),
along with an additional vestibular dysfunction leading
to disintegration between personal (vestibular) space
and extrapersonal (visual) space. Disintegration of perso-
nal space is present in he-autoscopy and out of body
experience but differences are mainly due to the level
and type of vestibular dysfunction. In more detail: out of
b o d ye x p e r i e n c e sa r ea s s o c i a t e dw i t hs p e c i f i cv e s t i b u l a r ,
graviceptive and otholithic sensations that are character-
ized by a variety of sensations including feeling of eleva-
tion and floating, he-autoscopy is associated with a
moderate and more variable vestibular disturbance while
no vestibular disturbance is evidenced in autoscopic hal-
lucination, feeling of a presence, negative heautoscopy
and inner heautoscopy. Moreover, the high frequency of
visual hallucinations and hemianopia in patients with
autoscopic hallucination suggests that defective visual
processing of bodily information is the main causing
factor for disintegration in personal space in autoscopic
hallucination.
Therefore according to Blanke we speculated that the
different forms of autoscopic phenomena are related to
different degrees of vestibular dysfunction. We hypothe-
size that autoscopic seizures occur because of ictal dis-
turbances of the normal integration process of body
representation within parieto-occipital networks in
which the right inferior parietal region plays a signifi-
cant role. The integration of proprioceptive, tactile and
visual information with respect to one’s body with ves-
tibular information is important for the constant updat-
ing of the movement and position of single body parts
and entire body. In order to create a central representa-
tion of one’s own body, the brain must integrate and
weigh the evidence from different sensory sources.
Electrophysiological [57] and neuroimaging [27,29]
studies showed that the vestibular cortex is a multisen-
sory cortex receiving not only vestibular information,
but also visual, proprioceptive and tactile cues from
the whole body. We believe that these multisensory
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about body movements and body position in space with
respect to other body segments and to the ground. The
implication of temporo-parietal junction in embodiment
and in self processing is suggested by neuroimaging stu-
dies in healthy subjects [29,58-60]. These studies exam-
ining visuo-spatial pathways showed the involvement of
many other cortical areas such as prefrontal, parietal
and temporal cortex. The “cortical midline structures”
have been recently identified as intimately related to the
experience of the self [61]. Therefore the temporo-parie-
tal junction might be a crucial structure for conscious
experience in a widely distributed network of cortical
areas.
In conclusion it is not known which of the many
senses are primarily involved in the generation of he-
autoscopy. Data in literature shows that visual theories
cannot entirely explain autoscopic phenomena and
points to the importance of non visual, body-related,
mechanisms such as proprioceptive and/or kinaesthetic
processing. A further aspect in favor of tactile and pro-
prioceptive mechanisms was given by the different body
positions reported by patients, upright for he-autoscopy
and supine for out of body experience, suggesting differ-
ential influences of proprioceptive and tactile processing
in different types of autoscopic experiences. Blanke and
Mohr [31] summarized anatomical findings of their ana-
lysis evidencing that he-autoscopy seem to primarily
involve the left temporo-parietal junction and out of
body experience the right. The evidence of the temporal
lobe involvement in body-distortion processing and
impairments in own-body transformations was high-
lighted in a recent report [62]. Yet self-representation
has been shown to depend also on the prefrontal cortex
and its connectivity with temporo-parietal junction
[63-66]. Accordingly, we believe that he-autoscopy
might not only be mediated by the temporo-parietal
junction but also depend on frontal lobe functioning
and processing and the diffusion of the discharge on the
anterior channels during the recorded autoscopic sei-
zures corroborates this idea (Figure 3C-D). A putative
implication for fronto-parietal connectivity also in out of
body experience was recently proposed [67]. Others
authors [68] stress the visual modality of these phenom-
ena and hypothesize a process of cognitive dedifferentia-
tion in which visual hallucinations are derived from
available non-visual sensory cues through an underly-
ing hyperconnectivity of cortical structures regulating
vestibular and visual representations of the body and
those responsible for the rotation of environmental
objects. Probably a specific cortical network is involved
in the perceptions of body into space and studies of
cerebral connectivity during vestibular stress could be
an helpful and interesting approach to a better
understanding of autoscopic phenomena. Because of
the severe psychiatric symptoms presented in our
patient, we could not perform the combined EEG/fMRI
analysis that recently allowed to identify the cortical
connection network sustaining persistent symptoms in
epilepsy [30], yet we believe that this approach might
be ideally suited to understand the mechanism of auto-
scopic phenomena.
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